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I. INTRODUCTION
Soft Corporation is a leading maker of software and operating
systems. It undertakes great measures to protect the secrecy of its
new products under development, plans to launch new products,
technical product specifications, and product source codes, all of
which it considers company trade secrets. A disgruntled employee,
John Sneaky, one of the few persons with access to the source code
to Soft's soon to be released operating system, Win100, posts the
source code (labeled "Confidential-Soft Proprietary Information")
on a members-only Web site critical of Soft, Softsucks.com.
Soft discovers the posting within six hours of its appearing on
the site, and after informing the site operator that the information is
a stolen Soft trade secret, it is immediately removed. Prior to its
removal, however, Sam Quickbuck had downloaded the source code.
When he realized the next day that the source code was no longer
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available on Softsucks.com he decided to capitalize on the
opportunity.
He posted a notice on his Web site offering the code for sale:
"Winl00 source code, original, (jacked from inside) available for sale.
Get it here before it's even released and stick it to Soft. If you
wanna buy it ($50), I'll give you a password to download it."
Soft sues Quickbuck for misappropriation of trade secrets,
seeking a preliminary injunction to prohibit his use and sale of the
source code. After a hearing, the court denies relief to Soft,
reasoning that, despite Soft's best efforts to keep the source code
secret, it has lost its trade secret status by virtue of it appearing on
the Internet and that Quickbuck cannot be enjoined from using it.
Soft now faces widespread use of its source code by other
competitors and a resulting loss of market share for its Winl00
operating system. As a result of the ruling, it can no longer claim
the source code as a trade secret.
This hypothetical' introduces the problem and accompanying
questions tackled by this Article. When, for instance, an employee
discloses an employer's trade secrets to the public over the Internet,
does our current trade secret framework appropriately address the
consequences of that disclosure? What ought to be the rule that
governs whether the trade secret owner has lost not only the
protection status for the secret, but also any remedies against use by
third parties? Should the ease with which the Internet permits
instant and mass disclosure of secrets be taken into consideration in
assessing the fairness of a rule that calls for immediate loss of the
trade secret upon disclosure?
A. The Power of the Internet
Although trade secret owners have always risked disclosure of
their highly sensitive and confidential information, today the
Internet magnifies that risk exponentially.2 It facilitates complete
1. This hypothetical is loosely based on United States v. Genovese, 409 F.
Supp. 2d 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussed infra Parts III.C and VIII.B.4).
2. The Internet has become an important part of daily life, connecting
approximately 800 million people to a global network. See Xuan-Thao N.
Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property Right, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4-5 (2004). Over fifty percent of all households are connected
to the Internet. See Daniel W. Park, Trade Secrets, the First Amendment, and
Patent Law: A Collision on the Information Superhighway, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 46, 47 (2004). Its presence has changed the way in which the world does
business and its impact on the economy is far reaching. See generally Andrea
M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network Theory Approach to
Internet Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 493, 499-500
(2004) (discussing trends in the Internet economy).
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destruction of a trade secret in an instant, and the law strips the
trade secret owner's power to control or contain the damage. Even
when the party posting3 the information may not have intended to
cause harm to the trade secret owner, the injury can be no less
devastating.4 One court, while refusing to enjoin publication of a
company's trade secrets on First Amendment grounds, nevertheless
noted the shift in balance of power made possible by the Internet:
"With the Internet, significant leverage is gained by the gadfly, who
has no editor looking over his shoulder and no professional ethics to
constrain him. Technology blurs the traditional identities of David
and Goliath."'
Unlike other mass media, which generally have staff who decide
what materials will be published, the Internet has no such filter.
Any person sitting at a computer can post information onto the
Internet, resulting in immediate and irreparable harm. One judge
captured the problem in these words:
The court is troubled by the notion that any Internet user...
can destroy valuable intellectual property rights by posting
them over the Internet, especially given the fact that there is
little opportunity to screen postings before they are made.
Nonetheless, one of the Internet's virtues, that it gives even
the poorest individuals the power to publish to millions of
readers can also be a detriment to the value of intellectual
property rights. The anonymous (or judgment proof)
defendant can permanently destroy valuable trade secrets,
6leaving no one to hold liable for the misappropriation.
The power of the Internet has added complexity to the
archetypal two person misappropriation framework traditionally
encountered in trade secret law. Misappropriation claims often
arise in an employment context, for instance, where an employee
3. This Article often refers to trade secret information being posted on the
Internet. Posting "consists of directly placing material on or in a Web site,
bulletin board, discussion group, newsgroup, or similar Internet site or 'forum,'
where it will appear automatically and more or less immediately to be seen by
anyone with access to that forum." O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d
72, 91 (Ct. App. 2006). It therefore allows direct self-publication of information,
or one may also send information to a site, the owners or moderators of which
make decisions about what to post. See id.
4. See Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (reversing district court dismissal, holding that FDA could be liable
for misappropriation of trade secrets where it posted plaintiffs trade secrets on
its Web site for five months).
5. Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
6. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 923 F.
Supp. 1231, 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citations omitted).
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leaves for new employment with a competitor and takes the former
employer's trade secrets. The employer, or trade secret owner, can
state misappropriation claims against the former employee and
often the new employer.7 In the case of an Internet disclosure,
however, the current law suggests that there is no claim against
third parties who discover the information, and thus no feasible way
to contain the dissemination of the trade secret.8
B. Legal Complications
Further complicating the situation is that trade secret law only
protects secret information. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that
information which appears on the World Wide Web, and which is
admittedly no longer secret, can retain trade secret protection. Yet,
trade secret law is also equitable and intended to regulate the
morality of the business world. Why then should we create
incentives for inappropriate and unethical conduct by permitting a
single individual's disclosure of a trade secret to destroy that which
has been so well guarded by a trade secret owner? A sound analysis
of this complicated problem calls for a balancing of the right of the
trade secret owner to preserve its trade secret information, the right
of an innocent independent third party to use information found in
the public domain, and the policies favoring fair competition.
A view from outside trade secret law also provides guidance for
and against retention of trade secret status after an Internet
disclosure. On one hand, constitutional law and patent law
considerations lean toward prohibiting restrictions on the use of
publicly available information. On the other hand, attorney-client
privilege cases, in analogous circumstances, support preservation.
Some of these areas of law provide further insight into analogous
incentives for wrongdoing.
C. This Article's Mission
Several commentators have identified the general problem
posed by trade secret disclosures over the Internet, but none have
analyzed the problem with the same depth and approach used in
this Article.9 Moreover, much of the literature addresses First
7. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles:
Fairness and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
167, 176-80 (2005) (detailing several representative cases).
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See, e.g., Victoria A. Cundiff, Trade Secrets and the Internet: Preventing
the Internet from Being an Instrument of Destruction, in llTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 347, 355-59 (PLI Intellectual Property, Course
Handbook Series No. 842, 2005); Park, supra note 2; Bruce T. Atkins, Note,
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Amendment challenges, with top scholars arguing from both ends of
the spectrum about the role of the First Amendment in trade secret
cases. 10  I enter the discussion from a different perspective,
ultimately landing somewhere near the middle of the spectrum
between those who would extend broad First Amendment protection
to anyone who posts trade secrets on the Internet and those who
would protect the status of trade secrets over First Amendment and
Internet challenges.
My objective is to articulate a workable test that courts can use
when deciding whether a trade secret that has been disclosed on the
Internet can still be preserved as secret, regardless of whether there
is or is not a First Amendment defense in the case. This Article
critically examines relevant trade secret doctrines, dissecting
assumptions and methodically examining whether it is possible to
retain trade secret protection in the face of a disclosure over the
Internet. It also draws guidance from other areas of law, and
together this critical examination informs what I coin a "sequential
preservation model." Accordingly, this model is a unique and novel
approach to the problem."
Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law Survive the
Internet?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1151; Ryan Lambrecht, Note, Trade Secrets and
the Internet: What Remedies Exist for Disclosure in the Information Age?, 18
REV. LITIG. 317 (1999); Matthew R. Millikin, Note, www.misappropriation.com:
Protecting Trade Secrets After Mass Dissemination on the Internet, 78 WASH. U.
L.Q. 931 (2000).
10. For those favoring trade secret protection over First Amendment rights,
see, for example, Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual
Property: The Clash Between Intellectual Property and the First Amendment
from an Economic Perspective, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 5
(2001); Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment: The
Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1035-46
(2000); Franklin B. Goldberg, Recent Development, Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 271 (2001); Adam W. Johnson, Injunctive Relief in the
Internet Age: The Battle Between Free Speech and Trade Secrets, 54 FED. COMM.
L.J. 517 (2002); Atkins, supra note 9.
For those advocating First Amendment rights over trade secret protection,
see, for example, David Greene, Trade Secrets, the First Amendment, and the
Challenges of the Internet Age, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 537 (2001); Mark
A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 229-31 (1998); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart,
and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REV. 697, 739-48 (2003).
11. Attempts to address the problem effectively must take into
consideration the various issues identified in this Article and tread a delicate
balance, being ever mindful of the goals and constraints of trade secret law and
its interaction with other areas of law. To do otherwise may risk undermining
the general principles of trade secret law. The state of Nevada, for instance,
enacted legislation in 2001 that provides that a trade secret disseminated on
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The sequential preservation model calls for a threshold
determination of whether the information was entitled to trade
secret protection before the Internet disclosure. If and only if it was,
then a three factor test will be used to evaluate whether it retained
the trade secret status and was ultimately misappropriated. Those
three factors are (1) the amount of time the information was exposed
on the Internet and the promptness of any action by the trade secret
owner to have the information removed, (2) the extent of the
disclosure, and (3) the likelihood that the recipient knew the
information was a trade secret.
Part II of the Article provides a background summary of trade
secret law. Part III summarizes the relevant case law in this area.
Part IV analyzes the third party disclosure problem. Insights from
other areas of law are provided in Parts V and VI. Part VII presents
the proposed model and the three factor test for analyzing these
cases, followed by a theoretical summary and application of the
model in Part VIII. Part IX addresses remedies available to a trade
secret owner, and the Article concludes in Part X.
II. TRADE SECRET LAW BACKGROUND
Unlike the other areas of intellectual property (copyrights,
patents, and trademarks), there is no federal statutory law
governing trade secrets. Rather, trade secrets are protected by state
law. Most states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
("UTSA"), and, as a result, there is some uniformity in defining
trade secrets and trade secret misappropriation. 12 The states that
have not adopted the UTSA tend to rely on common law based on
the Restatement of Torts.'3  Finally, and more recently, the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition" also addresses trade
secrets.'5 Its rules apply to actions under both the UTSA and the
the Internet shall remain a trade secret if the owner obtains an injunction to
have it removed within a "reasonable time." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600A.055
(LexisNexis 2005). For a host of reasons discussed infra, this legislation is not
well grounded. See infra Parts V, VI, and VIII.
12. It has been adopted in whole or part by forty-four states and the
District of Columbia.
13. See MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.02, at
1-4 (4th ed. Supp. 2005). The UTSA provides broader protection than the
Restatement in that it does not require that a trade secret be in use to be
protected, and it protects negative information. A negative trade secret is the
knowledge of what not to do or what does not work, a lesson learned from a
certain process or research and development effort that failed. See JAMES
POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 4.02 [3] (1997).
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995).
15. This is an interesting shift in the overall treatment of this area of the
law, which corresponds with the growing union of trade secret and unfair
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Restatement of Torts.6 Most courts appear to rely on the definitions
in the UTSA 7 or in the Restatement of Torts,8 and, as such, this
Article will as well for most of the analysis which follows.
A. Lawful Use of Another's Trade Secrets
Unlike patent law, which grants exclusive use to a patent
holder, the owner of a trade secret does not enjoy the same level of
exclusivity.'9 Not only can the same information be considered a
trade secret by more than one owner, but not all use of a trade secret
is an unlawful misappropriation.2 0 Rather, only trade secrets that
competition issues becoming evident in the case law. For instance, unfair
competition claims involving trade secrets often mirror trade secret
misappropriation claims. See, e.g., GlobeSpan, Inc. v. O'Neill, 151 F. Supp. 2d
1229, 1235-36 (C.D. Cal. 2001); IBM v. Seagate Tech., Inc., No. 3-91-630, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20406, at *11 (D. Minn. Dec. 31, 1991).
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39, Reporters'
Note, at 438 (1995).
17. The UTSA defines a trade secret as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique or process, that: (i) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). The UTSA
requires only reasonable efforts, not all conceivable efforts, to protect the
confidentiality of trade secrets. See Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d
452, 455 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Commc'n Servs. Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1253-54 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that
the church made reasonable efforts under UTSA to protect secrecy of religious
documents through the use of locked cabinets and safes, logging and
identification of materials, electronic sensors, alarms, photo identifications,
security personnel, and confidentiality agreements for all those given access to
materials).
18. See EPSTEIN, supra note 13, § 1.02, at 1-4. The Restatement of Torts
defines a trade secret as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). The Restatement then
provides examples, stating that a trade secret "may be a formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a
pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers." Id.
19. See Junker v. Plummer, 67 N.E.2d 667, 670 (Mass. 1946) ("The owner of
a trade secret, in contradistinction to the owner of a patent, has no such right in
the idea as will enable him to exclude others from using it. Thus if one acquires
a secret by honest means he may use it.").
20. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974);
Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1982).
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have been acquired through improper discovery are unlawful.21 A
trade secret owner may grant permission to use a trade secret, and,
even without consent or permission, a party may make lawful use of
another's trade secrets in three main ways.
First, one who independently discovers or invents a trade secret
is entitled to use it. 22 Second, one who actually reverse engineers a
trade secret (obtained fairly and honestly) is not subject to liability
• • • 23
for trade secret misappropriation. Finally, and most relevant to
this Article, where a party learns a trade secret through a disclosure
that was not made in breach of a contract or special relationship, or
with knowledge of such a breach, she is entitled to use it. 24 Thus, a
trade secret owner has no protection for a trade secret that is
accidentally disclosed.25  Of even greater significance is that once
disclosed, the trade secret no longer exists as to other parties
because the requisite level of secrecy cannot be met.26
B. Equitable Nature of Trade Secret Law
Trade secret law is the branch of intellectual property law that
most closely regulates standards of commercial ethics, guides
morality of the business world, and underscores fair dealing. 27 It is
probably in part for this reason that trade secret law is now codified
in the Restatement of Unfair Competition rather than in the
Restatement of Torts.28 Its equitable nature is evident in most court
21. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475-76.
22. Id. at 476.
23. See, e.g., id.; Chicago Lock Co., 676 F.2d at 405 (stating that locksmiths
may reverse engineer codes and then provide them for compilation); Smith v.
Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1953) ("It is unquestionably lawful for
a person to gain possession, through proper means, of his competitor's product
and, through inspection and analysis, create a duplicate, unless, of course, the
item is patented."); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14
U.L.A. 538 (2005).
24. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OFTORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939).
25. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476; Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove
Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 196 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[Elven a bona fide trade secret is
not protected against discovery by fair means, including accidental disclosure.").
26. See Lockridge v. Tweco Products, Inc., 497 P.2d 131, 134 (Kan. 1972)
("Once the secret is published to the 'whole world,'. . . it loses its protected
status and becomes available to others for use and copying without fear of legal
reprisal from the original possessor.").
27. See, e.g., Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481-82; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995); MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1.05, at
1-15 (1997).
28. Although the precise reason for this change is not explicitly stated,
perhaps it is because trade secret law is inextricably tied to the values of our
competitive marketplace. As the authors note:
[T~he law of trade secrets.., reflects the accommodation of numerous
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
opinions, as judges struggle to decide what is fair by assessing,
sometimes impliedly, elements such as good faith, honesty, and fair
dealing.29
Consistent with these underlying ethical and equitable
approaches, all three statutory frameworks of trade secret law
described above prohibit the use of improper means to acquire trade
secrets.30 This is not an insignificant fact and is crucial to analyzing
the third party problem presented in this Article. Thus, the extent
to which acquisition of another's trade secrets over the Internet
involved "improper means" 1 by both the original misappropriator
and the third party user ought to be the central inquiry once the
threshold question has been answered.32
III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT CASE LAW
The cases in this Part are representative of the trade secret
disclosure problem. They reflect the courts' attempts to wrestle with
the bright line rule against protecting non-secret information and
the equitable considerations underlying trade secret law. The cases
also reveal the range of potential actors who could expose secrets,
from insiders (like employees) to outsiders who purportedly are
motivated by the public interest.
interests, including the trade secret owner's claim to protection
against the defendant's bad faith or improper conduct, the right of
competitors and others to exploit information and skills in the public
domain, and the interest of the public in encouraging innovation and
in securing the benefits of vigorous competition.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (1995). See James J.
Mulcahy & Joy M. Tassin, Note, Is PepsiCo the Choice of the Next Generation:
The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and Its Place in New York Jurisprudence, 21
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 233, 242-45 (2003).
29. See, e.g., Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 579 (5th Cir.
1987) ("The essence of the tort of trade secret misappropriation is the
inequitable use of the secret."); see also N. Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484
F.2d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1973) (discussing the limited nature of remedies
available for theft of trade secrets).
30. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005);
RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995); RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939).
31. Under the UTSA, "Improper means includes theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain
secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
ACT § 1(1).
32. See infra Part VII.A for an explanation of the threshold question-
whether the information was entitled to trade secret protection before it was
misappropriated.
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A. The Church of Scientology Cases
In Religious Technology Center v. Lerma,3 Lerma, a disgruntled
former member of the Church of Scientology ("the Church"),
published documents taken from a court record onto the Internet.
34
The Church35 considered these documents to be trade secrets and
obtained a Temporary Restraining Order prohibiting Lerma from
publishing the alleged trade secrets.36 The Church also sued The
Washington Post for publishing a story related to and quoting the
alleged trade secret documents. 7 The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Post on the trade secret misappropriation
claims, reasoning in part that the documents no longer qualified as
trade secrets.3 8 The court was not moved by the fact that the Church
had taken extraordinary measures to keep the documents secret,
including having a Church member sign out the court file on a daily
basis.39
In another Scientology case, the Church sought an injunction
against another disgruntled former member who posted Church
writings on an Internet USENET group.4 °  In examining the
Church's claim that the writings were trade secrets, the court stated
that while the defendant could not rely on his own improper posting
of the writings to the Internet to support the argument that the
writings were no longer secrets, evidence that an unrelated third
party posted them would result in a loss of secrecy and a loss of
trade secret rights.' The court held that since the writings were
posted on the Internet, they were generally available to the relevant
public and there was no trade secret right available to support an
injunction.42
In a motion six months later, the Church again sought an
injunction on trade secret grounds, this time introducing consumer
surveys to show that the writings were not generally known.43 The
33. 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995).
34. Id. at 1364.
35. The Religious Technology Center is a non-profit corporation formed by
the Church of Scientology to protect its religious course materials. See
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc. (Netcom 1), 923 F.
Supp. 1231, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
36. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. at 1364.
37. Id. at 1365. The Post had obtained the documents from Lerma and
from the court file. Id. at 1364-65.
38. Id. at 1368-69.
39. Id. at 1365.
40. Netcom 1, 923 F. Supp. at 1239.
41. Id. at 1256.
42. Id. at 1256-57.
43. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc. (Netcom
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court struck the surveys as irrelevant because they were surveys of
the general public and not of the Church's competitors.44 However,
the court retreated from its earlier statement that posting to the
Internet destroys trade secret protection.45 Instead, the court
announced that a determination of trade secret protection "requires
a review of the circumstances surrounding the posting and
consideration of the interests of the trade secret owner, the policies
favoring competition and the interests, including first amendment
rights, [sic] of innocent third parties who acquire information off the
Internet."46  Because the trade secret status of the Church's
documents was an open question under this new test, the court
granted a preliminary injunction.47
B. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner
41
In DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, the plaintiff association
controlled the rights to an encryption program called controlled
scramble system ("CSS"), which restricted playback of encrypted
DVDs to DVD players and computers that could decrypt CSS.49 The
plaintiff alleged that by reverse engineering plaintiffs program, a
Norwegian teen created a program called DeCSS that allowed
encrypted DVDs to be played on any DVD player or computer. °
Defendant Bunner found and posted that program on the Internet
for anyone to use.51 The plaintiff filed a suit for injunctive relief to
prevent Bunner from posting or linking to the DeCSS program on
the Internet.5 2  The court noted that while Bunner did not use
improper means to acquire trade secrets under the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, Bunner disclosed trade secrets that he knew or should
have known were proprietary information.53 However, the court
denied the preliminary injunction, finding that it would be a prior
restraint of pure speech.54
II), No. C-95-20091, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23572, at *24, *26 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3,
1997).
44. Id. at *26.
45. Id. at *40-41.
46. Id. at *41.
47. Id. at *42.
48. 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Ct. App. 2001), rev'd, 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003),
remanded to 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185 (Ct. App. 2004).
49. Id. at 341.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 341-42.
53. Id. at 346.
54. Id. at 350-51.
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The court held that traditional intellectual property exceptions
to the prior restraint doctrine do not apply since Bunner did not
actually use the information or breach a contractual obligation.55
After an appeal to the California Supreme Court, which held that an
injunction would not violate the First Amendment if there was a
trade secret,56 the court was asked on remand to determine whether
a trade secret still existed.7  The court noted that widespread
publication of a trade secret over the Internet will destroy its status
as a trade secret.58 However, the court went further, reasoning that
the information retains its value to the creator if the Internet
publication is sufficiently obscure or transient so that it does not
become generally known to those who would consider it valuable.5
The court rejected plaintiffs public policy arguments for protecting
trade secrets, holding that allowing an injunction once a trade secret
has become public could theoretically put the entire general public
at risk for liability. ° Since the trade secret had been widely
disseminated, the court held that an injunction would not prevent
any further harm from occurring to the plaintiff and denied the
injunction.61
C. United States v. Genovese
62
In United States v. Genovese, defendant Genovese was charged
with offering Microsoft's source code for sale on the Internet in
violation of the Economic Espionage Act of 199663 ("EEA").64
Genovese challenged the indictment on the grounds that the statute,
which makes downloading and selling a trade secret a crime,
violated the First Amendment. 65  The court noted that the First
Amendment protects computer source code and other trade secrets,
55. Id. at 349.
56. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 14 (Cal. 2003).
57. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 187 (Ct. App.
2004).
58. Id. at 192.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 194.
61. Id. at 196.
62. 409 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
63. The Act provided the first comprehensive criminal federal trade secrets
law on trade secret theft and misappropriation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (1996).
The EEA criminalizes "theft of trade secrets," id. § 1832, and "economic
espionage" for the benefit of a foreign government, instrumentality or agent.
Id. § 1831. In order to state a claim under the Act for theft of trade secrets, the
government must establish that the defendant knowingly stole or obtained
information that was a trade secret without authorization. Id. § 1832(a).
64. Genovese, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
65. Id. at 256.
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but held that the First Amendment does not protect conduct such asS 66
trying to convert a trade secret for economic gain. Genovese also
made a due process challenge, arguing that criminalizing the
download and sale of trade secrets under the statute was vague
because he could not have known the source code was not generally
known or that Microsoft took reasonable measures to protect it.
However, the court held that under the EEA, a trade secret does not
lose its protection when "temporarily, accidentally, or illicitly
released to the public, provided it does not become 'generally
known.' 68 The court observed that since Genovese sold the source
code, it still retained some value and was not generally known.6
IV. ANALYZING THE THIRD PARTY PROBLEM
This Article tackles the problem that arises when an
independent third party7° discovers another's trade secrets on the
Internet and uses or intends to use it. Under this scenario, the
trade secret owner has misappropriation7 1 claims against the
original misappropriator, and, if the original misappropriator did
not post the information himself, whoever posted the information
66. Id.
67. Id. at 257.
68. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2000)).
69. Id.
70. An independent third party is independent of and has no connection to
or involvement with the original misappropriator of the trade secret.
71. The UTSA defines "misappropriation," as:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or
has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper
means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or
implied consent by a person who:
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade
secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew, or had reason to know,
that his knowledge of the trade secret was:
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized
improper means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to
the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its
use; or
(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had
reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it
had been acquired by accident or mistake.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005).
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may also be liable. As against an independent third party who
comes upon the information once posted, however, it is unclear
whether the trade secret owner has any remedies under trade secret
law to prevent use of the information.
Indeed, the current status of trade secret law would suggest
that the third party is entitled to use information she obtained from
the public domain, assuming that she did not employ improper
means to obtain the trade secret, has no knowledge that it was
obtained by improper means, or is not bound by any contractual or
special relationship with the trade secret owner.73 However, that
initial conclusion necessarily makes several underlying assumptions
about trade secret law and Internet publication.
Among these assumptions are that (1) the information was not a
trade secret at the time it was discovered, (2) the fact that the
information appeared on the Internet makes it public, generally
known, and readily ascertainable, and (3) the discovery was not
through improper means. This Part will dissect each assumption to
analyze whether it is reasonable to conclude that the trade secret
owner is not likely to prevail against an independent third party,
either because the information was not a trade secret at the time it
reached the third party or because even if the information is
determined to be a trade secret it was not misappropriated by the
third party. Parts V and VI will then turn for guidance to a broader
view outside of trade secret law, followed by the proposed model.
A. Is it a Trade Secret?
The first hurdle and first step to a trade secret owner whose
proprietary information has been discovered on the Internet is
proving that the information has not lost its trade secret status by
virtue of its publication in this medium. While in the typical
misappropriation case a trade secret owner must prove that the
information is the type of information that is protectable under
trade secret law and that she took reasonable steps to maintain its
secrecy, the Internet publication problem presented here is
72. To the extent one has exhibited discretion, akin to that of a magazine or
newspaper publisher, in deciding to disclose a trade secret, then she may be
liable. O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 98 (Ct. App. 2006)
(noting that disclosure of confidential information about a company may expose
a reporter or editor to liability).
73. See Lockridge v. Tweco Prods., Inc., 497 P.2d 131, 134-35 (Kan. 1972)
(reasoning that there can be no recovery against those who are "not
misappropriators in the first instance, or possessors of the secret by virtue of
learning it from the misappropriator(s) with knowledge that it was stolen ... "
(quoting Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 955 (D.C.
Cir. 1966))).
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complicated by additional layers of proof. This complication is
primarily because the third party (vis-A-vis, for instance, a former
employee who discloses an employer's trade secrets) would not be
breaching any contract or duty to the trade secret owner and would
have discovered the information in an arguably public place.74
Given the factual scenario presented here, the relevant
applicable requirements from the UTSA's 7 definition of trade secret
are that the information (i) not be "generally known" and (ii) not be
"readily ascertainable by proper means."76 This definition leads to
further inquiry to determine whether a posting on the Internet is
"generally known" and "readily ascertainable" and whether locating
such information via the Internet constitutes "proper means."77
Because of the nature of the Internet and the relatively unique
(to trade secret law) problem presented in this Article, it is
important to identify the accurate point in time at which the trade
secret status of the information should be determined and the party
from whose perspective the relevant inquiry should be made. One
possibility is to consider whether at the time the defendant
(independent third party) came upon the information it was a trade
secret. Another option is to consider whether the information was a
trade secret before it was misappropriated by the wrongdoer. The
former is a pre-misappropriation perspective, while the latter is a
post-misappropriation perspective. The post-misappropriation
perspective seems more consistent with trade secret law and the
manner in which misappropriation cases are generally analyzed. To
be sure, it is not the more favorable perspective for a trade secret
owner, because it lends itself to a more ephemeral view of trade
secrets when, despite a trade secret owner's best efforts, the owner
may lose trade secret protection because of the intervening acts of a
bad actor."
74. In cases where the information has previously or simultaneously
become available by means other than the Internet, it makes it even more
difficult for the trade secret owner to attempt to argue that it should be
protected. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp.
1519, 1526 (D. Colo. 1995) (noting that the information had been available in an
unsealed court file).
75. I rely on the UTSA because it has been adopted by a majority of the
states, and because its trade secret definition is consistent with both the
Restatement of Torts and the Restatement of Unfair Competition.
76. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 28 (Cal. 2003)
(Moreno, J., concurring) ("[Elven when a trade secret holder acts with perfect
diligence, it has no action against the republisher of no-longer-secret
information who does not act in privity with the original misappropriator.").
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Although the additional layer presented here, of an independent
third party discovering information on the Internet from a
misappropriator, is missing from the typical two-party trade secret
case, there does not seem to be sufficient reason to diverge from the
same analysis. In other words, in a situation when an employee
steals an employer's trade secrets, we would ask whether the
information was a trade secret at the time the employee took
possession of it. Similarly, with an independent third party, it
seems logical to consider whether at the time she discovered the
information it was a trade secret. Put in criminal terminology, in
order to be guilty of stealing a trade secret, the information must
have been a trade secret at the time the defendant came into
possession of it.
1. Is a Posting on the Internet "Generally Known"?
It is axiomatic that publicly available information cannot
qualify for trade secret status. 79 Given our understanding of the
Internet, it has become an implicit assumption that any information
posted on the Internet 8' is public.8' "[T]he act of 'posting' constitutes
publication to the world.8 2 If "generally known" is synonymous with
public, then it might explain why many courts assume that a trade
secret posted on the Internet has become generally known.
However, exploration below the surface of these assumptions merely
leads to further questions. For instance, does it matter if the
information is "known" or "knowable" to competitors? Does public
mean public accessibility or public publication? Does the obscurity
79. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984)
("Information that is public knowledge or that is generally known in an
industry cannot be a trade secret."); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 475 (1974) ("The subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be
of public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or business.").
80. Note that in some circumstances there can be various levels of access to
a Web site, ranging from publicly available portions to those that are restricted
to authorized users with passwords. However, this discussion assumes an
independent third party has accessed information from a publicly available site
or legitimately through a more restrictive site. See, e.g., Inventory Locator
Serv., LLC v. Partsbase, Inc., No. 02-2695MA/V, 2005 WL 2179185, at *2 (W.D.
Tenn. Sept. 6, 2005) (discussing a Web site with four levels of access).
81. See generally Oja v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 440 F.3d 1122, 1131
(9th Cir. 2006) ("Internet publication is a form of 'aggregate communication' in
that it is intended for a broad, public audience, similar to print media."); Jerome
Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating
that trade secrets posted on the FDA Web site are available to public); Am.
Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
posting information to a Web site available to public is distribution).
82. O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 91 (Ct. App. 2006).
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of the Web site matter, or are all Internet postings equal? An
attempt to answer these questions will be forthcoming after we
further dissect the legal definition of a trade secret.
The comments to the UTSA provide guidance in that they make
clear that "generally known" does not necessarily mean known by
the general public. 3 Indeed, a trade secret can be "generally known"
if it is known by at least one person who can obtain economic benefit
from the information. 4 It would therefore seem more precise to say
that information cannot be a trade secret if it is known (delete
"generally") by the relevant people 5 (i.e., those who may benefit
from it).8 6 Accordingly, it is difficult to challenge the emergent
conclusion that "posting works to the Internet makes them
'generally known' to the relevant people .... , Even though that
conclusion makes legal sense, from an equitable perspective, it
seems unfair to a trade secret owner that illegal conduct by another
could destroy a heretofore well-preserved trade secret.
The case law demonstrates courts' uneasiness with a bright line
rule, implying an instinctive, albeit unstated, concern for fairness
and the equitable nature of trade secret law. One trial court,
concerned about the incentives to wrongdoers, found that the mere
posting of information on the Internet does not destroy a trade
secret.88 According to the court, "To hold otherwise would do nothing
less than encourage misappropriaters [sic] of trade secrets to post
the fruits of their wrongdoing on the Internet as quickly as possible
and as widely as possible thereby destroying a trade secret
forever."8 9
The court was willing to recognize that publication on the
Internet does not automatically terminate the existence of a trade
secret and considered the amount of time the information was
posted and, thus, available for inspection. 90 To the court, where the
posting is "sufficiently obscure or transient or otherwise limited so
83. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538
(2005).
84. Id.
85. This does not include people to whom the trade secret owner has
disclosed the trade secret pursuant to a non-disclosure or confidentiality
agreement.
86. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., No.
C-95-20091 RMW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23572, at *40-41 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3,
1997); DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192-93 (Ct.
App. 2004).
87. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 923 F.
Supp. 1231, 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
88. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 190.
89. Id. at 190-91.
90. Id. at 192-93.
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that it does not become generally known to the relevant people, i.e.,
potential competitors or other persons to whom the information
would have some economic value," the trade secret status is
preserved. 91 The precise measure of obscurity or transience required
to protect the trade secret, however, is unsettled.
In the Religious Technology Center cases, one of the courts
noted that the fact that the information had been posted on the
Internet for ten days made it publicly available (destroying trade
secret protection) because during those ten days the information was
potentially available to millions of Internet users.9" According to
that court, "Once a trade secret is posted on the Internet, it is
effectively part of the public domain, impossible to retrieve. 93 In
another, related case, the court was wary of making the "overly
broad generalization" that posting works to the Internet would
destroy their trade secret status.94 Instead, the court recommended
consideration of the circumstances surrounding the posting.95 The
model presented here espouses precisely this kind of review of the
factual circumstances in an attempt to decide on a case-by-case
basis whether, among other things, the generally known standard
has been met.
2. Is a Posting on the Internet "Readily Ascertainable"?
It is interesting that the drafters of the UTSA chose a
conjunctive between "generally known" and "readily ascertainable."
This necessarily implies that they have separate meaning.
However, in practice, courts seem to struggle with determining the
meaning of these labels96 and more often simply do not consider the
readily ascertainable prong as a separate factor, but instead appear
97to collapse it into the generally known prong. Indeed, some states
that have adopted the UTSA have chosen to remove "readily
ascertainable" altogether from their definition of trade secret.98
91. Id.
92. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995).
93. Id.
94. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., No. C-95-
20091 RMW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23572, at *40-41 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1997).
95. Id. at *41.
96. See, e.g., United States. v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 630 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
("[Wihat is 'generally known' and 'reasonably ascertainable' about ideas,
concepts, and technology is constantly evolving in the modern age."); see also
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, 331 F. Supp. 2d 396, 417 (E.D. Va. 2004)
("What constitutes readily ascertainable through proper means is heavily fact-
dependent and simply boils down to assessing the ease with which a trade
secret could have been independently discovered.").
97. See Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
98. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(2), cmt. at 168 (West 1997)
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Even without this trend, under the circumstances presented here,
attempting to satisfy both "generally known" and "readily
ascertainable" does appear redundant. Given the nature of the
Internet, the meanings may converge, and one could posit that every
Internet posting is generally known and readily ascertainable or is
generally available and thus readily ascertainable.
In the context of the Internet, treating the two concepts the
same does not appear problematic. The very nature of the
Internet-that it allows equal access to anyone with a computer,
irrespective of certain traditional limitations to accessing
information, like geography and cost-means that it makes
information at least readily discoverable, if not ascertainable. 99
Moreover, considering that the relevant population consists of those
who could obtain economic benefit from the information, it is logical
that these arguably motivated individuals would be the very persons
surfing the Internet for information that would afford them a
competitive advantage.
Earlier in this Part I posed certain questions which, by virtue
of having dissected the definition of trade secret in the context of
the Internet, may now be easier to answer. First, if courts continue
to treat "generally known" and "readily ascertainable"
interchangeably, then it does not seem to make a significant
difference whether the information is "known" or "knowable" to
competitors. The former would fall under the "generally known"
category, and the latter, i.e., whether it is knowable, would be
captured under the "readily ascertainable" category.
The practical reality may be that the information will be known
by at least one person, typically the named defendant in the law
suit. That defendant will likely argue that the information is not a
trade secret because the nature of the Internet is such that others
have very likely accessed the information as well. This raises
another interesting question as to whether it is the trade secret
owner's burden of production to show that others have not accessed
the information, or the defendant's burden to show the opposite. If
posting information on the Internet makes it discoverable by and
thus knowable to the relevant public, then the mere fact that the
information is accessible to others may be sufficient to destroy
(explaining that the phrase was removed because it was "viewed as ambiguous
in the definition of a trade secret," but that "the assertion that a matter is
readily ascertainable by proper means remains available as a defense to a claim
of misappropriation").
99. The AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(Houghton Mifflin Co., 4th ed. 2000) defines ascertainable as "[t]o discover with
certainty, as through examination or experimentation."
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secrecy even without proof of direct knowledge or access.
Accordingly, even when the trade secret owner does not necessarily
know whether any specific competitors or others have accessed the
information, it may nonetheless have lost trade secret protection.
This approaches the bright line rule that publication in and of itself
extinguishes the trade secret.
As between public accessibility and publication, the inquiry is
the same, particularly in the context of the Internet. A posting on
the Internet, compared to, for instance, a disclosure in a report
sitting on an office shelf, 00 is both a publication 1 and a publicly
accessible publication. Thus, to the extent that generally known
and readily ascertainable are synonymous, the mere publication of a
trade secret on the Internet and its ensuing accessibility would
destroy the secret.
Finally, the many angles of the analysis seem to lead to the
inexorable conclusion that a posting on the Internet would most
likely defeat any trade secret protection. However, this may be true
only if one accepts that all Internet postings are created equal. If,
however, considerations of the obscurity of or accessibility to the
Web site, as well as timing and amount of exposure, affect the
"generally known" or "readily ascertainable" prongs, then perhaps a
different conclusion might be possible. The factors presented later
in this Paper attempt to accommodate this possibility.
B. Is it Misappropriation?
Having proved that the information is a trade secret, or likely to
be a trade secret, the second hurdle to a trade secret owner whose
proprietary information has been discovered on the Internet is
proving misappropriation. This is difficult because, on the surface,
the presence of the independent third party who has no duty to the
trade secret owner to maintain his secret coupled with the public
place discovery does not seem actionable. The view that any wrong
to a trade secret owner occurs only at the time of the improper
acquisition stems from the underlying construct of trade secret law
that trade secrets are not property.0 2 Rather, the presence of a
confidential relationship or good faith obligation is a necessary
100. Such a report is arguably not publicly accessible. Cf. In re Cronyn, 890
F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding in a patent case that a thesis in a college
library that was not indexed or catalogued was not sufficiently publicly
accessible to constitute a published prior art reference).
101. See, e.g., O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 102-03 (Ct.
App. 2006) (analyzing why Internet Web sites are publications).
102. The Restatement of Torts rejects the concept of a property interest in a
trade secret, grounding trade secret protection on a general duty of good faith.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939).
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prerequisite, and it is that breach that triggers something akin to an
enforceable property right in the trade secret.10 3 The key factors
then appear to be whether the information was discovered by
improper means and whether the third party should have known it
was discovered by improper means.
All three trade secret statutory frameworks include improper
means in defining misappropriation. 0 4 The relevant provision from
the UTSA appears to make a third party liable for misappropriation
if he or she "knew or had reason to know that his or her knowledge
of the trade secret was derived from one who used improper means
to acquire it." 1 5  This necessarily suggests a fact-intensive
determination into the third party's state of mind, her level of
knowledge that the information was a trade secret, and whether it
was acquired by improper means.
With respect to third parties, not only does the Restatement of
Torts define misappropriation to include a notice requirement when
disclosure is intentional, but also when the disclosure "was made to
him by mistake.'0 6 This raises an interesting question as to whose
mistake one should consider. Arguably the original misappropriator
who published the information intended to do so and thus did not do
so by mistake. On the other hand, the trade secret owner could
argue that it was a mistake because he or she did not intend to
disclose the trade secret. It is also unclear from the Restatement's
definition whether "notice of the fact"107 that the information is
secret is judged at the time the trade secret is discovered or at a
later time when the trade secret owner provides such notice to the
defendant. The cases seem to suggest the former.'
It is worth considering whether the manner in which the third
party obtained the information over the Internet is (or should be)
"improper means." 10 9  The phrase certainly captures unlawful
103. See Lockridge v. Tweco Prods., Inc., 497 P.2d 131, 136 (Kan. 1972)
(discussing why the misappropriation of a trade secret is not a continuing
wrong).
104. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939); RESTATEMENT (THmRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995).
105. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii). The Restatement of Torts and
Restatement of Unfair Competition definitions are consistent with the UTSA.
106. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 681 F.2d 161, 164 (3d Cir.
1982) ("[The defendant] had reason to know, and in fact knew, that the
drawings were secret when he obtained them, and that their release to him was
improper."); see also discussion infra Part VIII.B.3 regarding notice.
109. Improper means under the UTSA includes theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain
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conduct, but it has also been interpreted to cover lawful conduct.1 °
For the purposes of this problem, the assumption is that the third
party is not a hacker and has merely accessed the information
through a search engine or through another site to which she has
legitimate access. Accordingly, even given a broad interpretation of
improper means, it would seem very unlikely that this kind of
searching, in and of itself, would constitute improper means."1 The
end result would appear to be that a defendant who does not know
or have reason to know that the information is a trade secret cannot
be liable for misappropriation. As one court reasoned, "Although the
person who originally posted a trade secret on the Internet may be
liable for trade secret misappropriation, the party who merely
downloads Internet information cannot be liable for
misappropriation because there is no misconduct involved in
interacting with the Internet.""'
It is noteworthy that for most courts the question of whether
there was misappropriation comes back to the preliminary
consideration of whether the information qualifies as a trade
secret."13  This is perfectly logical, given that one cannot
misappropriate that which is not a trade secret. This observation
helps inform the model presented in this Article, since the
preliminary consideration of the protectable status of the
information is inescapable. However, once determined in the
affirmative, it must be divorced from the other factors in order to
avoid a tautology and permit a clearer, more distinct analysis of the
issues.
V. OTHER OBSTACLES TO TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
In addition to the hurdles to preserving the trade secret status
of arguably public information within trade secret law, there are
further barriers from other areas of law that may also be implicated.
secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
ACT § 1.
110. See, e.g., Nat'l Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 35-36 (Mo.
1966).
111. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (E.D. Va.
1995) ("It is the employment of improper means to procure the trade secret,
rather than the mere copying or use, which is the basis of [liability].' (quoting
Trandes Corp. v. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 660 (4th Cir. 1993))).
112. Id. at 1368.
113. See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 193
(Ct. App. 2004) ("[Ihf the allegedly proprietary information contained in DeCSS
was already public knowledge when Bunner posted the program to his Web site,
Bunner could not be liable for misappropriation by republishing it because he
would not have been disclosing a trade secret.").
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Both constitutional law and patent law lean toward prohibiting
restrictions on the use of publicly available information. The
applicable First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and patent law
doctrines are summarized below.
A. First Amendment
Defendants in these types of cases have asserted a First
Amendment right to disclose allegedly trade secret information
discovered on the Internet.14  "[T]he First Amendment generally
prohibits limitations, absent some extraordinary showing of
governmental interest, on the publication of information already
made public.""5  When weighing the jealously guarded First
Amendment rights against the commercial interests in protecting
trade secrets, courts are often reluctant to enjoin disclosures of trade
secrets.16  By implication, it would seem that if the First
Amendment always trumps an owner's right to protect against
disclosure, then trade secret law would be powerless to enforce non-
disclosure agreements or otherwise prevent disclosure of their secret
information. Accordingly, the California Supreme Court has
rejected a similar argument and made clear that an injunction
against disclosure of information that qualifies as a trade secret




Nonetheless, the obvious hole remains: where a trade secret has
been disclosed (and thus no longer qualifies as a trade secret under
current trade secret law), the First Amendment could protect the
disclosure."" This returns full circle to the ever critical
determination whether information, once posted on the Internet,
loses its trade secret status. A positive response to that question
leads to the likely conclusion that the information, for a whole host
of reasons, including the First Amendment, can be used freely.
Furthermore, in the absence of a fiduciary duty or
confidentiality agreement not to publish trade secret information,
one court has ruled that the First Amendment prevails. In Ford
114. For further discussion about the First Amendment in this context, see
generally Lambrecht, supra note 9.
115. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 27 (Cal. 2003) (Moreno,
J., concurring).
116. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th
Cir. 1996) (refusing to enjoin publication of trade secrets improperly obtained in
violation of a protective order, noting that "[tihe private litigants' interest in
protecting their vanity or their commercial self-interest simply does not qualify
as grounds for imposing a prior restraint").
117. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 19.
118. See id. at 10 n.5.
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Motor Co. v. Lane, 9 the defendant operated a Web site with news
about Ford and its products . 20  Lane received confidential Ford
documents from an anonymous source and initially agreed not to
disclose most of the information. 2 1 However, Lane eventually
published some documents on his Web site relating to the quality ofFord' , .122
Ford's products, thinking that the public had a right to know. He
did so despite knowing that the documents were confidential."
23
Ford sought a temporary restraining order to prevent publication of
the documents, claiming the documents were trade secrets. 124 The
court acknowledged (without any discussion) that Ford could show
Lane had misappropriated its trade secrets, but denied the
injunction on First Amendment grounds, considering an injunction
to prevent Lane from publishing trade secrets a prior restraint.
25
Despite evidence that Lane had used the Internet and the
confidential material to extort Ford, the court noted that Ford's
trade secrets were not more important than the documents in the
Pentagon Papers case and not more inflammatory than the article in
the Near case. 26 Since a prior restraint was not justified in either of
those cases, a prior restraint could not be justified in this case.12 7
B. Fourth Amendment
Further constitutionally based obstacles to restricting use of
publicly available information lies in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Some scholars have explored analogies between
Fourth Amendment privacy interests and the secrecy requirement of
• 128
trade secret law. In particular, when a person unlawfully invades
one's zone of privacy to steal private, incriminating information and
then reveals that information to the police or the public, courts have
held that this conduct does not violate the Fourth Amendment.'29
119. 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
120. Id. at 747.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 748.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 750.
126. Id. at 751-53 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
127. Id. at 753.
128. See, e.g., Atkins, supra note 9, at 1182-83; Note, Trade Secret
Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit Response to the Fourth Amendment Analogy,
106 HARV. L. REV. 461, 465-66 (1992).
129. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First
Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099,
1135-36 (2002) (discussing the "silver platter" doctrine which permits an
independent agent to break the law to obtain incriminating evidence, and turn
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Thus, the fact that trade secret law similarly provides incentives to
break the law is not a unique concept.
130
C. Patent Law
Attempts to restrict the use of information found in the public
domain are outside the purview of trade secret law and instead are
covered by patent law, which governs property rights in publicly
known information. The underlying premise is that "all ideas in
general circulation [are] dedicated to the common good unless they
are protected by a valid patent."131 Accordingly, attempts to use
state trade secret law to restrict use of information in the public
domain are preempted by patent law.
132
Patent law further lends support to the idea that the
intervening illegal act of a misappropriator could negatively affect
the rights of the owner. The two cases discussed below make clear
that even when a misappropriator steals an invention while it is a
trade secret and then, unbeknownst to the inventor, puts it on sale
or uses it publicly one year before the inventor files a patent
application on the invention, that use or sale prevents the inventor
from obtaining a patent.
In Lorenz v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co.,133 plaintiff Lorenz sued
defendant Colgate for a declaration that Lorenz's soap manufacture
patent was valid and Colgate's was void.3  Lorenz alleged that he
disclosed the invention to Colgate and that disclosure gave Lorenz
priority over the invention. 35 Colgate asserted that its use of the
patented process more than a year before Lorenz filed the patent
application rendered Lorenz's patent invalid under prior public
use. 136 Lorenz in turn argued that prior use does not apply when an
that evidence over to law enforcement on a "silver platter").
130. However, unlike the Fourth Amendment "silver platter" cases, which
justify such incentives by arguing that the Fourth Amendment only proscribes
government action, an analogous rationale in trade secret law is not as strongly
supported. See id. at 1136-38.
131. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bircron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (quoting
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969)).
132. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164
(1989) ("That which is published may be freely copied as a matter of federal
right." (quoting Bailey v. Logan Square Typographers, Inc.; 441 F.2d 47, 51
(1971))); DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 195 (Ct. App.
2004) ("[Tlhat which is in the public domain cannot be removed by action of the
states under the guise of trade secret protection." (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at
481)).
133. 167 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1948).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 424.
136. Id.
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invention is "pirated" by another person. 137 However, the court held
that the prior public use statute had no exceptions and any
intervening public use bars the inventor from obtaining a patent.38
The court stated that the policy behind the statute was to protect
the public's interest, and therefore it was up to the inventor to
protect his discovery from being used.3 9
In Evans Cooling Systems, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.," '
Evans filed suit against General Motors ("GM") for infringing upon
Evans's patent on engine cooling.' GM moved to declare the patent
invalid on the basis that GM sold cars with the invention before
Evans sought a patent, but Evans asserted that GM should not be
able to invalidate the patent because GM stole his engine cooling
invention and allowed dealers to sell vehicles containing the
invention.' After reviewing prior case law, the court concluded that
since the public use of the invention by the dealers was innocent, the
public use bar should apply. "3
VI. ASSISTANCE FROM ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE CASES
Despite the seemingly uphill battle in trying to preserve the
trade secret status of information disclosed on the Internet, one area
of law provides some hope, even if only by analogy. Cases involving
inadvertent disclosure of materials protected by the attorney-client
privilege are in some ways analogous to the trade secret problem
identified here. As the summary below reveals, the courts tend to
protect the privileged status of the information, especially where the
necessary precautions were taken and the disclosure occurred
inadvertently or through misconduct. Thus, even where
confidentiality of the materials may have been lost, the privilege can
be preserved. Although there is no direct parallel to trade secret
law, in that once secrecy is lost, the trade secret status is also lost,
the model presented here attempts to capture the spirit of those
cases by recognizing that there may be certain exceptional
circumstances where trade secret status may be retained.
137. Id. at 425.
138. Id. at 429.
139. Id. at 429-30.
140. 125 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
141. Id. at 1450.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1454. However, the court noted that if GM did misappropriate
the invention, Evans could still sue for misappropriation of trade secrets. Id.
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A. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co.'4
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co.,
Berkley moved to suppress evidence stolen by a former employee
from a grand jury, asserting that it was protected by attorney-client
privilege.14 5 The court initially held that historically the attorney-
client privilege did not apply to stolen or lost documents as a matter
of law.4 6 On motion to reconsider, the court noted that the more
modern approach is that when attorneys and clients take reasonable
precautions to ensure confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege is
not lost." 7 Since the former Berkley employee stole the documents,
the court held that the theft is analogous to an attorney disclosing
privileged information in bad faith, which does not result in a loss of
privileged status under modern precedent. "8
B. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dean'49
In this case, the Washington Post published excerpts from an
Authority to Sue Memorandum prepared by plaintiff Resolution
Trust Corporation's ("RTC") counsel."50 When defendant Symington
moved to order discovery of the memo, RTC asserted the attorney-
client privilege. 15 Symington argued that unless RTC could prove
the memo was stolen, the privilege was waived when the memo was
leaked to the newspaper."52  Citing Berkley, the court rejected
Symington's argument and noted that disclosure of the memo was a
criminal act."53 The court held that since RTC proved they took
precautions to ensure the memo's confidentiality, they established
that the release of the memo was not voluntary and that they did
not waive the attorney-client privilege of the memo."
C. Smith v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co.
5
'
In Smith v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., defendant Miles, Inc.,
inadvertently included a document from in-house counsel in a
144. 466 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn. 1979).
145. Id. at 865.
146. Id. at 868 (citing 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2325 (McNaughton rev.
1961)).
147. Id. at 869.
148. Id.
149. 813 F. Supp. 1426 (D. Ariz. 1993).
150. Id. at 1427.
151. Id. at 1428.
152. Id. at 1428-29.
153. Id. at 1429 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley &
Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn. 1979)).
154. Id. at 1429-30.
155. 838 F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
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document production given to plaintiff Smith.5 6  When Smith's
lawyer subsequently leaked the document to the press, and accounts
of the document appeared in newspapers from Florida to Alaska,
Miles filed a protective order, asserting attorney-client privilege to
the documents. 57  The court noted that wide circulation of a
document is not, by itself, grounds for revoking attorney-client
privilege.'58 The court found a distinction between the document
losing its confidentiality and losing its privilege, stating that a
document can retain its privilege even if it is no longer
confidential."59  Even though the document was no longer
confidential, it still retained the attorney-client privilege because
Miles did not waive the privilege. 6 °
D. United States ex rel. Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp."'
In this case, the government sought access to privileged
documents via a discovery request, asserting that defendant Martin
Marietta waived the privilege by allowing a former employee to
possess a draft of the document."' The court found that whoever
gave the privileged documents to the former employee was not
authorized to have them,63 that the former employee was not
authorized to keep them,6 4 and that he made false statements to
keep them.16  Since the confidentiality of the documents was
breached due to the unauthorized actions of a former employee, the
court refused to conclude that reasonable precautions were not
taken and held that the privilege was not waived.
6
VII. THE SEQUENTIAL PRESERVATION MODEL
The complexity of the problem presented here lies not
necessarily in the analytical framework of trade secret law available
for determining whether information is deserving of trade secret
protection. Rather, it is the recognition of the injustice that could
result from strict application of the law and the ensuing incentives
for illegal conduct that is disturbing. Given the equity rationale
underlying trade secret law, these concerns compel an exploration
156. Id. at 1575.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1576.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1577.
161. 886 F. Supp. 1243 (D. Md. 1995).
162. Id. at 1244.
163. Id. at 1245-46.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1246.
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for a more just result. There is an underlying recognition that
perhaps something more than a bright line rule may be appropriate
in some cases.
With that in mind, I propose below what I coin a "sequential
preservation model" as a tool to achieve a fairer result in those
limited cases where the injustice would otherwise be especially
grave. When properly applied, the factors should provide relief in
extraordinary circumstances. For the vast majority of cases,
however, the default rule under the current trade secret framework
should apply. Publication of trade secrets via the Internet will cause
a loss of trade secret protection. This may appear harsh in some
circumstances, but trade secret owners have a duty to be vigilant.
Having chosen this method of intellectual property protection, they
must be ready to face the possible disadvantages of the regime. 67
A prudent approach to addressing these types of cases requires
deliberate and careful consideration of the many issues raised in the
Article, including the rights of a trade secret owner to maintain the
protection of his or her valued information versus the right of the
public (and competitors) to use information found in the public
domain. The conduct leading to the disclosure does not necessarily
change the analysis; thus, an inadvertent disclosure by the trade
secret owner or one of her agents is treated in the same manner as a
disclosure resulting from criminal or other illegal conduct by an
employee or third person. Nonetheless, the model is informed by the
various legal frameworks and theories discussed thus far.
A. Threshold Issue-Establish Trade Secret Status
As a threshold matter, preliminary consideration must be given
to determine whether the trade secret owner can reasonably
establish that the information in question was entitled to trade
secret protection before it was misappropriated on the Internet. 168 In
particular, the most critical part of that inquiry should be whether
the trade secret owner took reasonable steps to preserve the secrecy
of the information. This is consistent with the law and practice
already required in trade secret misappropriation cases, as the trade
secret owner bears the burden of establishing the trade secret status
167. As discussed earlier, the harshness of such a rule is not unique to trade
secret law and is supported by both constitutional and patent law principles.
See supra Part I.B.
168. The standard utilized for this inquiry should be akin to the likelihood of
success on the merits standard used in preliminary injunction cases. Most
trade secret cases, particularly in the context of the problem presented here,
will be decided at a preliminary injunction hearing. Thus, use of this standard
should present no further difficulty and may very well fold into the injunction
test.
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of the information. Furthermore, the extent to which the alleged
trade secret information is available or has been disclosed through
sources other than the Internet will also be relevant to determining
trade secret status.169
If the court determines that the trade secret owner is not likely
to succeed in proving that the information was a trade secret, then
the bright line rule of trade secret disclosure should apply and the
inquiry need not proceed any further. That is, the trade secret
owner is not entitled to enjoin use of the alleged trade secret
information disclosed on the Internet. As a practical matter, this is
reasonable in light of the fact that failure to prove trade secret
status is fatal to any claim for misappropriation, and is especially so
where, as here, the action would involve an independent third party
who accessed the information from the public domain.
If a court determines that the information was deserving of
trade secret status before it was allegedly misappropriated, then the
next step is to determine, via the factors below, whether, despite the
disclosure, it has nonetheless retained its trade secret status.170 The
choice to phrase the inquiry in terms of retention of status, rather
than loss of status, is deliberate, as it underscores the underlying
expectation that retention of trade secret status after disclosure is
the exception, not the rule. Accordingly, it is expected that with
rigorous application and weighing of these factors, only a very small
number of cases would qualify for retention status.
B. The Three Factors
Of the three factors identified below, the first two focus on the
trade secret owner and the trade secret. The first factor considers
the time interval of trade secret exposure and whether the owner
was sufficiently prompt in acting to save the trade secret after
discovering the disclosure. The second factor looks at whether the
trade secret has essentially entered the public domain as a result of
the disclosure. In light of the equitable considerations underlying
trade secret law, however, it also seems fair to introduce a third
factor which considers the recipient's good faith. This factor will
169. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (noting that, in addition to having been posted on the Internet, the
information was available in a public court file for twenty-eight months).
170. This is consistent with some courts finding that accidental disclosures
may not lead to loss of trade secret protection. See B.C. Ziegler & Co. v. Ehren,
414 N.W.2d 48, 53 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). Further, some courts will provide
"limited" protection to a trade secret after incidental disclosure. See, e.g.,
Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Ethex Corp., No. SA-01-CA-646-OG, 2004 WL 2359420, at
*32 (W.D. Tex. July 14, 2004); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995).
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specifically answer whether the independent third party has
misappropriated the trade secret and therefore should be enjoined.
This inquiry is entirely consistent with the definition of
misappropriation, which includes consideration of the recipient's
knowledge that the information is another's trade secret. 71  The
factors ought to be evaluated sequentially, at least to the extent that
the first two must be considered before the third.
1. Time and Action
This first factor would require consideration of the amount of
time that the information was exposed on the Internet and the
promptness of any action by the trade secret owner to have the
information removed. More favorable consideration will be given to
situations where (a) the information has been posted for a very short
period of time (twenty-four to forty-eight hours) and (b) the owner
discovered the publication and took action immediately (within
twenty-four to forty-eight hours) to have it removed. By analogy,
given the importance of trade secrets to a business, this factor
expects the trade secret owner to treat the discovery of a disclosure
as a parent who discovers a child is missing.
In light of the threat to trade secrets posed by the Internet,
trade secret owners have an obligation to monitor the Internet for
potential wrongful disclosures. Were there any question of the
existence of this obligation, the examination of the issues in this
Article leaves no doubt that such must be the case. In deciding to
choose trade secret protection over other options to protect
intellectual property (e.g., patent law), a trade secret owner
undertakes this responsibility as part of the bundle of disadvantages
associated with trade secret protection.
The amount of time of exposure and promptness of action that
will be considered sufficient will depend on the circumstances.
However, the rate at which information moves through the Internet
dictates that the promptness be correspondingly rapid. Information
that has been posted for more than approximately twenty-four to
forty-eight hours is much more likely to have become "generally
known" and is thus much less likely to meet the test for trade secret
protection.
A trade secret owner who discovers the information must
respond immediately and can show that it took prompt action by, for
171. This reasoning is also similar to the tipper/tippee theory of liability in
insider trading, which extends liability to tippees who trade based on inside
information received from a misappropriator, provided that the tippee knows or
has reason to know the tipper breached a duty of trust and confidence. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2006); see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
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instance, filing a lawsuit, seeking an emergency temporary
injunction, contacting the Internet service provider to have the
information removed, 72 or sending a cease and desist letter.73 While
this is not an exclusive list, the goal is to separate those who have
"slept on their rights" upon discovering the potentially fatal
disclosure from those who have acted consistent with the danger
that has befallen their business. This requirement also implicitly
provides corroborative evidence of the true value of the trade secret
to the business.
2. Extent of Disclosure
The second factor considers the extent of the disclosure. This
includes not only how much of the trade secret was disclosed, but is
also related to the first factor in trying to ascertain the nature of the
site on which the information was posted (public availability). It
attempts to address the necessary element of whether the secret
became "generally known or knowable." It further permits
exploration of the premise that "[publication on the Internet does
not necessarily destroy the secret if the publication is sufficiently
obscure or transient or otherwise limited so that it does not become
generally known to the relevant people, i.e., potential competitors or
other persons to whom the information would have some economic
value.' 74
This factor evaluates the specific site on which the information
was posted. A more prominent disclosure on a highly visited
webpage might require more prompt action and greater concern
than a disclosure on an obscure, members-only chat room with
limited membership. If the information was published on a network
with controlled access to a specific membership, particularly where
the membership is a small, well-defined, and finite group, then this
factor weighs in favor of the trade secret owner. If, however, the
172. The tools currently in place for addressing removals from Web sites are
not satisfactory given the special concerns posed in these kinds of cases. If
trade secret owners are to bear the burden of acting swiftly to remove trade
secrets from Web sites, then it is incumbent upon our legal system to provide
the appropriate, efficient, and effective mechanisms to do so. A mechanism
akin to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's safe harbor provisions for
Internet service providers who post copyright protected materials is a useful
starting point. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). The author plans to address this
topic in a separate forthcoming paper.
173. The appropriate strategy must be carefully tailored in light of the
circumstances. See Cundiff, supra note 9 (discussing considerations in
litigating to remove trade secrets from the Internet).
174. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192-93 (Ct.
App. 2004).
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group consists of precisely the relevant people who would most
benefit from the information, then it may be more difficult to argue
that the trade secret has not become "generally known." A further
reason why a closed network favors retention of the trade secret is
that the members' identities are known, and it might be easier to
obtain injunctive relief against them.17
5
The amount of secret information that was disclosed may also
be probative of whether the information deserves to retain its trade
secret status. In circumstances where only portions of the trade
secret were disclosed and the remaining undisclosed portions
continue to maintain their competitive value to the trade secret
owner, a court could find that the trade secret protection has not
been completely lost.
17 6
This examination of the extent of the disclosure is supported by
non-Internet related cases that require something more than mere
public accessibility of the trade secret, namely publication, before
finding loss of the protection. For instance, in cases addressing
unsealed filing of trade secret information in public court records,
evidence of further publication of the trade secret is required to
destroy trade secret protection. "7 Admittedly, the nature of the
Internet-unlike a public court file in a court house-is such that
publication to the relevant public can be virtually instantaneous,
and, as such, there is a significantly smaller window of opportunity
for the trade secret owner to protect the secret status of the
information. Nonetheless, this factor allows for a court to give a
thoughtful assessment to the extent of exposure, rather than a
presumption that the disclosure (particularly in isolation) destroyed
the secret.
3. Recipient's Reason to Know the Information Was a Trade
Secret
This final factor turns from the trade secret owner's actions to
the recipient's state of mind and is an important part of the
definition of misappropriation. Related to the first factor, if the
trade secret owner provided notice to the recipient in a timely
fashion that the information was a trade secret, then the acquisition
by "improper means" may be a stronger case. Furthermore, if the
175. See Lambrecht, supra note 9, at 338.
176. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 923
F. Supp. 1231, 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Smokenders, Inc. v. Smoke No More, Inc.,
No. 73-1637, 1974 WL 20234 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 1974).
177. See Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 418-19
(4th Cir. 1999) (discussing cases dealing with disclosure of trade secrets in court
files); see also Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 849
(10th Cir. 1993).
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evidence independently suggests that the recipient knew or should
have known the trade secret status of the information, then this
factor will weigh in favor of the trade secret owner.
Under the UTSA, one is liable for misappropriation if "he
obtains information from a third person and then 'discloses or uses'
that information, knowing, or possessing information from which he
should know, at the time of disclosure or use that the information is
a trade secret and that it had been misappropriated by the third
person.,178 The defendant's knowledge that the information was a
trade secret is also evidence of misappropriation under the
Restatement of Torts.17 9 Circumstantial evidence can be weighed to
determine the likelihood that the defendant knew the acquisition
was wrongful, and a defendant cannot shield himself by "studious
ignorance of pertinent 'warning' facts."'80 Defendant's constructive
notice that the information was a trade secret is sufficient.8 The
Restatement's definition of notice provides guidance:
One has notice of facts .. .when he knows of them or when he
should know of them. He should know of them if, from the
information which he has, a reasonable man would infer the
facts in question, or if, under the circumstances, a reasonable
man would be put on inquiry and an inquiry pursued with
reasonable intelligence and diligence would disclose the
facts. 182
Accordingly, if the evidence suggests that a reasonable person would
have been on notice 8 3 that the information received was the
wrongfully disclosed trade secret of another, then the defendant
should be liable for misappropriation. 1
84
Even though the burden of proof remains with the trade secret
owner to prove the defendant's guilty state of mind, it will be
important for the defendant to marshal facts to effectively prove a
negative: that she did not have reason to know the information was
a trade secret. In doing so, she may rely on the argument that the
trade secret, through its posting, had become generally available. In
178. IMED Corp. v Sys. Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992)
(interpreting state version of the UTSA).
179. See id. at 346-49; see also supra Part IV.B.
180. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., 407 N.E.2d 319,
324 (Mass. 1980).
181. See C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., No. 93C1601, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3221, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 1998).
182. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. 1 (1939) (citation omitted).
183. This generally refers to notice at the time of the disclosure. However,
notice from the trade secret owner after the initial disclosure may also suffice.
See C&F Packing Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3221, at *17.
184. See id. at *19.
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expressing that position, it is important to try to avoid the
tautological reasoning that has befallen some courts, i.e., whether
the information was a trade secret in the first place.' 8 Thus, the
line between the defendant's state of mind and the general
availability of the information may become blurred in the analysis.
As one court noted, for instance:
In a case that receives widespread publicity, just about anyone
who becomes aware of the contested information would also
know that it was allegedly created by improper means.... [1In
such a case the general public could theoretically be liable for
misappropriation simply by disclosing it to someone else. This
is not what trade secret law is designed to do. 86
One value of this model and the factors presented here is that
the question of whether information qualifies as a trade secret
would have already been answered positively as a threshold matter.
Thus, at this point in the model, an analysis of the facts supporting
the defendant's state of mind would be separate from that
question.'" Evidence of the defendant's state of mind relative to the
trade secret status of the information will also depend on the
particular circumstances and will consider any bad faith on the part
of the defendant. A defendant could also present any First
Amendment or other defenses at this juncture.
Evidence of the trade secret owner's proactive steps or prior
relationship with the defendant may also bear on the defendant's
bad faith or culpable knowledge. Materials that are clearly labeled
and stamped indicating that they are confidential, proprietary, or a
trade secret will be helpful.' Evidence that this particular
defendant has previously tried, legitimately or illegitimately, to
obtain the trade secret from the owner may also be relevant.
Attempts to extort benefits from the trade secret owner in exchange
for returning the materials will also signal culpability. 8 9 Finally,
185. See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 194
(Ct. App. 2004) (suggesting that knowledge about the unethical origin of the
information is insufficient to prevent use of information that has become
publicly available).
186. Id.
187. This knowledge requirement is consistent with the criminal claim for
theft of trade secrets found in the Economic Espionage Act, which requires that
the defendant knowingly stole or otherwise obtained the trade secret
information. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000).
188. See, e.g., O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 79 (Ct. App.
2006) (noting that electronic slides were "conspicuously marked as 'Apple Need-
to-Know Confidential'").
189. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 747, 753 (E.D.
Mich. 1999) (defendant threatened to publish "disturbing" materials about
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evidence that the defendant knew the trade secrets were obtained in
violation of a confidentiality agreement, license agreement, or a
fiduciary obligation weighs in favor of the plaintiff.9
If someone other than the original misappropriator posted the
information (and is the first to do so), then she, as the publisher,
ought to be in a worse position than the independent third party
who discovers the posting.'9 ' That person or entity is likely to fall
within a conspiracy-type analysis for obtaining the secret from the
misappropriator with knowledge of the wrongful acquisition.1
92
Receiving the information directly from the original misappropriator
or an associate/agent, and deciding to post it, carries, at the very
least, a taint of misappropriation. 193 Posting the information does
not purge that taint and precludes the poster, like the original
misappropriator, from claiming that the information has now
become generally known and is not a trade secret.
94
plaintiff on his Web site and to solicit trade secrets from plaintiffs employees).
190. See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 2003)
(discussing how trade secrets were obtained through reverse engineering in
violation of license agreement and that defendants knew of this improper
means of acquiring the trade secret).
191. This would encompass owners and operators of Web sites who make
decisions about what materials to publish on their sites. Analogous to their
traditional media counterparts, newspaper and magazine editors and reporters
for instance, they could be liable to the trade secret owner and subject to an
injunction. This is an unsettled area of the law, however, and the argument
espoused here appears to be novel. See O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr.
3d 72, 99-106 (Ct. App. 2006) (reasoning that operators of Web sites are
"publishers"); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (addressing
whether the media may be liable for using information unlawfully obtained by a
third party); MARC A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON, & LYRISSA BARNETr
LIDSKY, MASS MEDIA LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 536-547 (7th ed. 2005). But see
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to enjoin publication of trade secrets improperly obtained in violation
of a protective order); Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D.
Mich. 1999) (refusing to enjoin publication where no fiduciary duty or
confidentiality agreement exists).
192. See Lockridge v. Tweco Prods., Inc., 497 P.2d 131, 135 (Kan. 1972).
193. Cf. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (E.D. Va.
1995) ("Because there is no evidence that The Post abused any confidence,
committed an impropriety, violated any court order or committed any other
improper act in gathering information from the court file or down loading
information from the Internet, there is no possible liability for The Post in its
acquisition of the information."). Some Supreme Court cases also support the
proposition that the conduct of a publisher may be taken into consideration in
deciding whether to grant First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467
U.S. 20 (1984).
194. See Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 955
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VIII. SUMMARY AND APPLICATION OF THE
SEQUENTIAL PRESERVATION MODEL
To more clearly illustrate the connection between the
components of the model and their theoretical underpinnings, I
present the summary below. In the subpart that follows I then work
through some of the case examples to illustrate application of the
model.
A. Theoretical Checklist of the Model
A court faced with an Internet disclosure problem can utilize
this model (in conjunction with application of the preliminary
injunction standard) 95 to determine whether the trade secret status
of the information has been preserved and whether to enjoin an
independent third party. One value of this process is that it
provides for deliberate consideration of the trade secret law
requirements, avoiding automatic and potentially erroneous
assumptions on a case by case basis.
A. Was the disclosed information deserving of trade secret
protection before it was posted on the Internet? This is
the threshold determination. If the answer is no, there is
no need to apply the model; there cannot be
misappropriation and an injunction cannot issue. If yes,
proceed to the rest of the model.
B. Did the information retain its trade secret status despite
the Internet posting? To answer this question, apply the
first two factors-time and action and the extent of
disclosure-to the facts of the case. If the answer is no,
end the analysis; there cannot be misappropriation or an
injunction for that which is not a trade secret. If yes,
proceed to the final step.
C. Was there misappropriation by the defendant
independent third party? To answer this question, apply
(D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Once the secret is out, the rest of the world may well have a
right to copy it at will; but this should not protect the misappropriator or his
privies."); see also Lockridge, 497 P.2d at 135 ("We do not believe that a
misappropriator or his privies can 'baptize' their wrongful actions by general
publication of the secret."); cf. Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d
1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that where FDA had posted plaintiffs trade
secrets on its Web site without authorization, it could still be liable for
misappropriation even though the trade secrets had been publicly available on
the Web site for five months).
195. See generally Rowe, supra note 7, at 201-07 (discussing implications of
seeking injunctive relief in a misappropriation case).
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the third factor-recipient's reason to know the
information was a trade secret. If the answer is yes, an
injunction should issue; otherwise, there is no trade
secret liability and an injunction is not appropriate.
B. Application with Case Examples
The case examples below illustrate the impact of the various
phases of the model. For ease of reference, I have used cases that
have already been discussed in this Article, which also happen to be
among the main cases of relevance in this area. Relying on the facts
as reported in the respective opinions is limiting insofar as we are
bound by the context and posture of the case as it was originally
presented. Taken together, however, they are nonetheless useful for
illustrating various aspects of the model. In some instances the
original outcome of the case is consistent with the outcome that
would have been achieved using the model. That may very well be
because of the court's attempt to reach an equitable result, rather
than a more principled reasoning process, such as that offered by
the sequential preservation model.
1. Religious Technology Center v. Lerma
This case likely fails the threshold part of the model because the
information arguably lost its trade secret protection before Lerma
posted it on the Internet (and thus well before the Post obtained it).
The documents were present in an open court file for about twenty-
eight months prior to Lerma's Internet publication,'96 signifying a
failure to protect the secret status of the information. The court
could have been persuaded, however, by the Church's argument that
the appearance in the court file was beyond its control and despite
its best efforts. Indeed, not only had the Church filed a motion
seeking that the court seal the file,'97 but after denial of that motion
it took the extraordinary precaution of having a church member
check out the court file every day to prevent others from seeing it.198
Even if a court were swayed by that argument, and the analysis
moved to the second part of the model, it would certainly fail at this
stage. In considering the first two factors of the model, the fatal
blow would be dealt by the fact that before the Post acquired the
information for its story, the documents had been posted on the
Internet (by Lerma) for more than ten days 99 (exceeding the twenty-
196. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va.
1995).
197. Id. at 1364.
198. Id. at 1365.
199. Id. at 1368.
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four to forty-eight hour guideline suggested in the model) on a
publicly available Web site and would thus be generally known. °°
Accordingly, the model would direct that the trade secret status of
the information had not been preserved. The court's holding that
the Post's actions did not constitute misappropriation is consistent
with the outcome under the model.
2. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner
Whether the disclosed information in this case was deserving of
trade secret protection before it was posted on the Internet by
Bunner is a question that the court ought to have addressed in
greater detail. 20' The precise information that the plaintiff claimed
as a trade secret was DeCSS, which plaintiff had not, in fact,
created, but rather had been created through reverse engineering.0 2
Because a person may lawfully reverse engineer another's trade
203
secrets, and given that the defendants in this case had not
themselves reverse engineered the plaintiffs code, it is highly
questionable that the DeCSS should have been entitled to trade
204secret protection. Moreover, the evidence suggests that by the
time Bunner posted the code on his Web site, it had already been
"distributed to a worldwide audience of millions."20 ' Accordingly, a
rigorous analysis under the model would have failed the threshold.
Since the court assumed, however, that the reverse engineered
code was entitled to trade secret protection, then the analysis would
proceed to the second part of the model. After discovering his
posting, it took DVD CCA approximately two months to file a legal
action against Bunner.0 6 Such delayed action would not survive the
prompt action required under the model. Further crippling the
200. Id.
201. In one sentence, the court notes, "We have only very thin circumstantial
evidence of when, where, or how [the reverse engineering] actually happened or
whether an enforceable contract prohibiting reverse engineering was ever
formed." DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 194 (Ct.
App. 2004).
202. Id. at 188.
203. See supra Part II.A.
204. The plaintiff claimed that the reverse engineering occurred in breach of
a license agreement. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 188.
Nevertheless, under the facts of the case, the presence of a trade secret is
dubious. See also Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts
Between Trade Secrets and the First Amendment (Aug. 9, 2006) (unpublished
draft manuscript), available at http://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers/
TS%201st%20A%204th%20dr.pdf (discussing use of mass market licenses to
override the reverse engineering privilege of trade secret law).
205. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 193.
206. Id. at 188.
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plaintiff at this stage is the extensive level of disclosure: "by the
time [the] lawsuit was filed hundreds of Web sites had posted the
program, enabling untold numbers of persons to download it and to
use it. '20 7 Consequently, there was no preservation and no trade
secret to misappropriate. The court's denial of an injunction fits the
model .
3. O'Grady v. Superior Court
Although the focus of this case was on resolving a discovery
dispute20 9 rather than deciding a trade secret misappropriation case,
the facts provide a useful illustration for the model. The case
presents some thorny issues, the implications of which are worth
wrestling with under the model, even if only at the margins. More
specifically, unlike the other cases discussed in this Part, here, the
third party, O'Grady, did not obtain the alleged trade secrets from
an Internet posting, but rather was the first to post the information
on the Internet after having obtained it elsewhere.210
The less challenging part of the analysis is that the threshold
determination is more easily met here than in the two prior cases.
Apple Computer, Inc.'s ("Apple") plans to release a new product
would likely qualify for trade secret protection before it was posted
by O'Grady or sent to him by e-mail. Some of the information was
derived from an Apple electronic presentation clearly labeled "Apple
Need-to-Know Confidential," and Apple would have demonstrated
that it "undertakes rigorous and extensive measures to safeguard
information about its unreleased products."21' Apple was further
prepared to show that the information "could have been obtained
only through a breach of an Apple confidentiality agreement."
212
Given all of these indicia of steps to protect the secrecy of the
information and of its competitive value to the company, the
threshold requirement would be satisfied.212
207. Id. at 195.
208. Under the reasoning stemming from the model, the defendant's First
Amendment defense would not have been reached because there would be no
need to invoke the third part of the model (which would have considered
defendant's state of mind and defenses).
209. Petitioners in the case sought a protective order to prevent Apple
Computer, Inc. from discovering the identities of anonymous persons who had
provided allegedly trade secret information to them about Apple's plans to
release a new product. O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 76 (Ct.
App. 2006). The petitioners posted the information on their Web sites. Id. at
76-79.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 79-80.
212. Id. at 80.
213. While distinguishing Bunner, the court, in the context of its First
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At this point the retention analysis becomes complicated.
O'Grady does not fit the third party who finds the trade secret on
the Internet mold because he allegedly received the trade secret
information via e-mail from Apple insiders.2 " Accordingly, the
underlying principles supporting the model would suggest that we
bypass the question of retention and proceed to the
misappropriation inquiry.1 5 In analyzing O'Grady's state of mind
and reason to know that the information was a trade secret, a court
should weigh such factors as the "taint" associated with his having
received (and perhaps solicited) the trade secrets from Apple
insiders against him.216 As a publisher, however, he would be
entitled to raise a First Amendment defense regarding the
newsworthiness of the disclosure and ultimately may prevail.
Finally, permit me to indulge in one more modification in order
to create a true third-party Internet disclosure scenario and engage
in a retention analysis under the model. Assume that an Apple
competitor discovered the product release plans from O'Grady's
Amendment analysis, suggests that certain types of information are more
worthy of trade secret protection than others. In particular, the court mentions
that the kind of information at issue here (plans to release a product) may not
rise to the same level as technical information about how to create the product.
Id. at 113. While that kind of reasoning might be of some merit (albeit limited)
in a First Amendment analysis of newsworthiness, see id. at 113-15, it is not
appropriate for determining whether information is entitled to trade secret
protection in the first instance. The UTSA and other applicable trade secret
frameworks already provide the criteria for such determinations, and those
ought to be sufficient. There is no sliding scale: either something is a trade
secret or it is not. As even the O'Grady court has expressed in reference to
information that is worthy of publication, "courts must be extremely wary about
declaring what information is worthy of [trade secret protection] and what
information is not" because to do otherwise would undermine trade secret law.
Id. at 114.
214. See id. at 83-84.
215. Although e-mails involve use of the Internet, they generally do not rise
to the same level as Internet postings for the purposes of the analyses presented
in this paper. Because they are typically directed to a relatively small number
of people or a finite group, e-mails do not generally have the instant mass
dissemination quality of an Internet posting on a publicly available Web site. (I
recognize, however, that spam e-mails and the ability of recipients to forward e-
mails to others in virtually unlimited fashion, could be problematic. Thus, in
the event a trade secret is disseminated in this fashion, the analysis may be
affected). Accordingly, the likelihood of the information having entered the
public domain and having lost its trade secret status is not as strong when
transmitted by e-mail. As a result, the theoretical framework would more
closely resemble non-third party Internet cases and proceed to the
misappropriation finding, once the trade secret owner has established key
elements such as value and secrecy.
216. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
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postings, and Apple files a misappropriation action against the
competitor. The facts of the case would suggest that the trade secret
would not be preserved.
The retention inquiry would focus on Apple's reaction to
O'Grady's postings, and the nature of those postings. O'Grady's
articles about the new product ran on five separate days, and
Apple's first "cease and desist" contact to O'Grady came nineteen
days after the first article appeared.217 It took five more days after
that to file the complaint.218 While this may have been relatively
prompt action for a plaintiff merely seeking to identify the sources of
a breach of confidentiality, it is not enough for one seeking to
prevent information from becoming generally known to the relevant
public. The fact that O'Grady's Web site was "devoted to news and
information about Apple Macintosh computers" leaves little doubt
that the trade secret reached the relevant people.219
The nature and amount of information disclosed would also
weigh against Apple. To the extent it claims its plan to release this
particular product as a trade secret in order to control "timing and
publicity for its product launches,"220 then O'Grady's articles stole its
thunder and there was nothing left of the secret to preserve. The
trade secret would therefore be lost, and the competitor would be
entitled to use it.
22
'
4. United States v. Genovese
As a result of its procedural posture and context, this case does
not provide sufficient relevant details to work through each
sequence of the model.222  It does, however, provide a useful
illustration for the third part of the model, and as such, I will make
certain assumptions and draw inferences where the voids exist.
First among those assumptions is that the Microsoft source code was
a trade secret before it was posted on the Internet. Genovese
himself "acknowledged both that the source code was proprietary to
Microsoft and that someone else penetrated whatever safeguards
217. See O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 80.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 77.
220. Id. at 80.
221. Assuming, arguendo, that Apple had acted within twenty-four hours of
the first article to stem further publication about the new product, then there
may have been a better chance of preserving the secret. In keeping with the
court's reasoning, O'Grady's First Amendment arguments in the final part of
the model, however, may have saved him from a misappropriation finding.
222. It is a ruling on a motion to dismiss a criminal indictment under the
EEA. See United States v. Genovese, 409 F. Supp. 2d 253, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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Microsoft enlisted to protect it. 223
There are essentially no facts from which to determine whether
the source code retained its trade secret protection by the time
Genovese found it on the Internet.224 I will, therefore, assume that
the facts (similar to the hypothetical presented at the beginning of
the paper) would show that Microsoft acted with the requisite
promptness to stem the dissemination of the code and that theS • 221
extent of the disclosure was minimal , thereby preserving the trade
secret status of the information.
Finally, we would arrive at the misappropriation stage of the
model and examine Genovese's reason to know that the source code
was a Microsoft trade secret and the presence of any bad faith. On
that point, the evidence exists and weighs in favor of Microsoft. The
court notes that Genovese (a) describes the code as "jacked,"226 (b)
indicates that others would have to "look hard" to find it
elsewhere,2 2 7 (c) was on notice that Microsoft had not publicly
released the code,228 and (d) offers the code for sale and successfully
sells it because of its relative obscurity.229 It is also highly unlikely
that he would succeed on a First Amendment defense, given that he
was behaving more as a salesman than a reporter. Accordingly, this
would present an appropriate case for an injunction.
IX. REMEDIES
A court, finding misappropriation after hearing the facts and
230
weighing the factors presented above should issue an injunction.
The scope of that injunction will vary depending on the particular
circumstances. 23' Removal of the information from the Web site (if it
223. Id. at 258.
224. Id. at 254-55. The opinion does not indicate, for instance, the Web site
from which he downloaded the code, how long it appeared on the site, what
action (if any) Microsoft undertook to remove the information from that site,
and with what degree of promptness.
225. In attempting to sell the source code, Genovese indicated that "others
would have to 'look hard' to find it elsewhere." Id. at 257.
226. An abbreviation for "hijacked," which the court interpreted to mean
"stolen" or "misappropriated." Id. at 257 n.3.
227. Id. at 257.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Where the defendant has made use of the trade secret, a court could
also order monetary damages in addition to an injunction. See EPSTEIN, supra
note 13, at § 3.02[B].
231. The three types of injunctions in trade secret cases are (1) prohibitions
against disclosure or use, (2) sanctions against engagement in competitive
employment, and (3) bans on the manufacture of products in which the trade
secret is an essential ingredient. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 10.5(3), at
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has not already occurred) would certainly be necessary.232 A court
could further enjoin the recipient from using the information, at
least for a certain period of time. While this does not erase the
information from the hands of a competitor, it could at least mitigate
some of the damage by delaying use of the information in a manner
that would allow the defendant to compete unfairly with the trade
secret owner.233 The injunction should also prohibit the defendant
and her agent from further disseminating the information.
A more difficult problem for the trade secret owner, however,
would be that members of the public, other than those named in the
suit, could not be enjoined from using the information. Because
law and public policy favor the unfettered use of information in the
public domain, and courts likely lack jurisdiction to enjoin non-
parties in a lawsuit, the trade secret owner's prospects for
containing use of the information are bleak.235
A trade secret owner can pursue a misappropriation claim
against the original misappropriator (if known) and may also have
claims against those who aided and abetted the misappropriation.
Thus, to the extent the information was posted by someone other
than the original misappropriator, that person may also be liable.
Even if the misappropriator may have succeeded in destroying the
trade secret status of the information vis-A-vis others, trade secret
law does not permit him or her to benefit from use of the
• .. 236
information. Thus, for instance, such a person is not entitled to
claim immunity on the basis that the information is no longer secret.
Assuming, as is often the case, that the misappropriator does not
have deep pockets, a victory against him may be hollow and
unsatisfying for a trade secret owner who now suffers the
730-31 (2d ed. 1993).
232. Note that a "cached" version of information may continue to reside in
search engines even after the information has been removed from an active
page. Cundiff, supra note 9, at 351.
233. See DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 194 (Ct.
App. 2004).
234. See United States v. Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 1998)
("A district court may not enjoin non-parties who are neither acting in concert
with the enjoined party nor are in the capacity of agents, employees, officers,
etc. of the enjoined party."); see also Additive Controls & Measurement Sys.,
Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 154 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
235. See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 194 (noting that an
injunction is inappropriate where the information is no longer secret). A trade
secret owner may consider turning to other areas of law for relief or to criminal
prosecution. Depending on the nature of the trade secret information, copyright
laws, for instance might be an alternative avenue.
236. See Lockridge v. Tweco Prods., Inc., 497 P.2d 131, 135 (Kan. 1972).
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237permanent loss of its trade secret.
Given the current status of the law, it becomes clear that a
trade secret owner's best and most effective weapon is protection of
the trade secret information to prevent disclosure in the first
place.238 This requires absolute vigilance and knowledge of potential
threats, among the most dangerous of these being the Internet. In
the event that a disclosure is made despite best efforts, prompt
action in addressing the situation is critical.239  Since trade secret
owners have the legal burden of proving the trade secret status of
their information when they seek to enforce protection, it is
incumbent upon them to be mindful of that burden long before
litigation arises. Otherwise, it may be too late once the milk has
been spilled.
X. CONCLUSION
At the outset of this Article, I presented the hypothetical
involving Soft Corporation. Where a trade secret, such as the source
code for a program, is stolen from its owner and posted on the
Internet, the default rule would be that it becomes a free for all. By
virtue of the fact that it has been posted, it becomes public and,
consequently, loses its trade secret protection. The ensuing result is
that independent third parties, including competitors, are entitled to
use it, and the trade secret owner, despite years of laudable efforts
to maintain the secret, suffers a fatal loss at the hands of a
wrongdoer. The apparent injustice in that conclusion does not go
unnoticed.
237. See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 195.
238. Trade secret owners can take such proactive steps as entering into clear
and specific non-disclosure agreements with employees and other authorized
persons, limiting disclosure of information to a need-to-know basis, clearly
marking documents as confidential and trade secret, and monitoring employees.
See generally Rowe, supra note 7, at 192 n.171, 208, 213 (2005); Cundiff, supra
note 9, at 353-54.
239. This is consistent with some courts finding that accidental disclosures
may not lead to loss of trade secret protection. See, e.g., Healthpoint, Ltd. v.
Ethex Corp., No. SA-01-CA-646-OG, 2004 WL 2359420, at *32 (W.D. Tex. July
14, 2004); B.C. Ziegler & Co. v. Ehren, 414 N.W.2d 48, 53 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995). In
light of the unique and potentially destructive power of the Internet, trade
secret owners should also be provided with the necessary legal tools and
resources with which to exercise their duty of vigilance and to facilitate removal
of trade secret information that has been posted or where posting is imminent.
In that regard, legislative action may be necessary to ensure that the laws that
regulate the Internet and Internet providers incorporate considerations of the
danger the Internet poses to trade secrets and, more generally, businesses.
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Given that trade secret law is intended to regulate the moral
and ethical pulse of competitive commercial behavior, this Article
set out to explore the problem presented by trade secret Internet
disclosures and to identify whether, at least in some circumstances,
it may be possible to retain trade secret status after a disclosure.
Review of the various legal theories supports the general rule that
trade secret status is lost upon disclosure. Nevertheless,
considering the equitable and doctrinal considerations underlying
trade secret law and drawing from analogous attorney-client
privilege cases, there is support for an argument that trade secret
status may be saved in some circumstances.
Accordingly, I presented a model comprised of three factors,
which may be used as a guide to decide which cases qualify for this
exception. The model is drawn from and supported by the various
legal issues surrounding the problem. While, in reality, it may only
save a small number of cases from the general rule, its value lies in
its use as an instrument that may be applied by courts to yield
consistent results. It provides an avenue to work within the existing
constraints of trade secret law to hopefully achieve more just results
in compelling cases. It illustrates that "[t]he Internet, as a mode of
communication and a system of information delivery is new, but the
rules governing the protection of property rights, and how that
protection may be enforced under the new technology, need not
be.
240
240. Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 912-13 (Ct. App.
2001).

